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TRIPS Boomerang-Obligations for
Domestic Reform
Harold C. Wegner*
ABSTRACT

Today, one of the biggest obstaclesfacing inventors is
the problem of patent harmonization. Inventors, who spend
their time, money, and resources to develop new technology,
are faced with the problem of ensuring that their new
development receives patent protection not only in their home
countries, but also worldwide. This problem is complicated
by the fact that the United States maintainsa different patent
filing process than most other developed nations. Efforts of
the international community to harmonize these different
approaches,however, have been only partiallysuccessful.
In this Article, Professor Wegner examines the latest
attempt by the internationalcommunity to harmonize patent
law minimum standards. First, Professor Wegner traces the
historical path of harmonization, examining previous efforts
at patent harmonization by the European Union and the
United Nations Committee of Experts. He then examines the
reluctance of the United States to move to a 'first-to-file"
patent system. In addition, Professor Wegner examines the
requirements of the new Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual
Property Agreement (TRIPS).
In support of the TRIPS
Agreement, he urges the United States to honor the treaty
commitments in this area so that the world can more quickly
develop afairsystem to deal with the global patentproblem.

*
Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program,
George Washington University National Law Center; Director, The Dean
Dinwoodey Center for Intellectual Property Studies, Washington, D.C.; of counsel,
Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C.
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I. OVERVIEW

The spread of patent law minimum standards to developing
countries as part of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property' (TRIPS) Agreement of the new World Trade Organization

1.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IC: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS],
reprinted in

RESULTS

OF

THE

URUGUAY

ROUND

OF

MULTILATERAL

NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (GATT Secretariat ed.. 1994).

TRADE
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(WTO) is well documented elsewhere.2

This Article, however,

considers the impact of the WTO on U.S. patent law, particularly
in the context of its impact on the patent harmonization process.
The road to patent harmonization may be traced back
centuries to the earliest patent laws.3 While efforts to harmonize

the world's patent laws came close to success through efforts
within the United Nations World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), they ultimately failed in large part due to
the determination of a small but influential group within U.S.
industry. 4 The opposition to United States participation in a
harmonization treaty was in large measure due to anti-foreigner
discrimination found in U.S. law that denied foreign inventors
equal access to the United States "first inventor" system. 5
Harmonization forces prevailed in the Uruguay Round, thereby
compelling the United States to amend its domestic law to end
such discrimination.6 As a second target, the "Hilmer doctrine"
was an object of reform. 7 Although those efforts were successful,
it remains to be seen whether efforts will be made in the near
term to compel United States reform in this area.

II.

HARMONIZATION RETROSPECTIVE:

SETTING THE WTO TABLE

A. Several Centuries of Pre-HarmontzationActivity
Harmonization of patent law was preceded by several
centuries of largely primitive patent protection stemming from a
Germanic influence 8 and parallel efforts in England. It began

2.
E.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component. of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L

LAW. 345 (1995).
3.
See Infra Part II.A.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part III.
See Infra Part IV.
See Infra Part V.

7.

See Infra Part VI.

8.
The earliest continental origins of the modem patent system are traced
to Germanic patents to mining water technology, Wasserkiinste. See HAROLD C.
WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION § 140, at 2 (1993) (citing ERICH KAUFER, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 2 (1989)). Kaufer traces the Venetian system to
such Germanic roots.
Kaufer finds no basis to consider any link of the modern patent system to
much earlier times. He says that "[iln Egypt and other ancient cultures, no
patent-like institutions have been discovered, and it is likely that none existed,
since scientific and technological knowledge were closely held within priestial acts
and guarded through secrecy." Id. § 130, at 2. Cf. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL
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with a Venetian patent for water mining technology as early as
1409. 9 Later, a patent system for technology emerged 0 that in
the 1500s spread to Lyons and then to other French cities. 1

Finally, it became the foundation for the world's most important
patent "registration" system. 12 The English system is derived
from patents for skilled craftsmen who were induced to come to
3
England from the Continent.1
Modern efforts to harmonize patent law on a global basis
have proceeded for more than a century. Starting with the

H. DAvIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1990) ("It is possible to trace
the development of [U.S.] patent law back to ancient Greece.").
9.
WEGNER, supra note 8. § 140, at 3.
Venice granted the German Henricus von Heslingen a privilege to exploit
an ore mine and use the needed water and timber according to the
common law prevailing in Germany....
In 1488, the Venetian Senate
promulgated the Statuto Minerarla. A German language copy-evidently
for use by the German miners in the service of the Republic--exists In the
archives of Innsbruck. Careful inspection reveals it to be in large measure
a copy of the Schladminger Bergbrlef--a Tyrolean mining order from the
year 1408.
Id. (citation omitted).
10.
Id. § 140, at 5.
[Clonventional wisdom is that the first patent law is said to be the
Venetian Act of 1474, but the first specific patent grant is said to have
taken place in Florence in 1421.... Early Venetian patents provided a
dual right that included both the exclusionary right that later became the
sole right of [U.S.] patent law, but also importantly the privilege to operate
the patented invention free from interference by the guild's monopoly in
the particular area in question. The Venetian patent statute gave a
privilege of ten years to inventors of new arts and machines.
Id. (citations omitted).

11.

Id. § 150, at 5.

12.

The registration system means that a patent is filed and then granted

or "registered." Whether the patent is to novel subject matter is considered later
in litigation. This is in contrast to the U.S. "examination system," where the
patent examiner determines whether an invention is novel (and meets other
patentability criteria) prior to the grant. For a considerable period of time (17931836), the United States had emulated the French registration system.
13.
Id. § 160, at 7.
[Elarly English grants were not designed to foster new discoveries, but to
Import existing trades. For example, John Kemp the Fleming was granted
an English patent in 1331 to bring to England his servants, apprentices,
fullers, dyers and other experts in the weaving art. In 1336 two Brabant
weavers were granted patents to practice their trade in York. In 1368,
three Delft clock-makers were granted exclusive privileges in England: and
in 1651 Groyette and Le Leuryer were granted a patent on the
manufacture of white soap.
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original Paris Convention of 1883,14 much progress was achieved

and foreigners today enjoy a most-favored-nation status, known

as "national treatment,"' 5 and a right of priority, both offensive
and defensive. 16 The road to harmonization or even toward a
favorable attitude to patents, however, has been bumpy at best.
Two of the key major economic countries of the world even
abolished patents for several years.' 7 Early on, the United States
stood on the sidelines.' 8 Nevertheless, murmurings favoring
harmonization have surfaced from time to time. 19
B. EuropeanLeadership up to the 1980s

The leadership role in the move toward harmonization was
seized by Europe forty years ago. The starting point was a
uniform patent classification system and consideration of a

14. The United States became a member of Paris only in 1903, and by
that time the treaty had been further revised in the 1900 Brussels
Revision. The current agreement in force is the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828
U.N.T.S. 107, as revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14,
Between Brussels and
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303.
Stockholm, the treaty underwent changes as part of the 1911 Washington
Revision, 1925 Hague Revision, 1934 London Revision and the 1958
Lisbon Revision.
Id. § 310.
15.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20.
1883, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 823 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
The Paris Convention, art. 4, provides that if a patent application is
16.
filed in any union state within one year of the "home country" or other first union
filing (and assuming simple formalities are met), the application is effectively
back-dated to the first filing. Id. art. 4. This is important because it is the filing
date that establishes the date of priority of invention for all major countries
outside the United States. Thus, if a third party has a filing date even one day
junior, that third party's right to a patent is denied.
17.
"The Dutch abolished their patent system in 1869 and had no patent
law until 1912.
The Swiss abolished patents in 1850, with a partial
reintroduction of patents in 1888; it was only in 1907 that the modem Swiss law
came into force." WEGNER, supra note 8, § 183.
18.
For example, it took a full 20 years for the United States to join the
Paris Convention (in 1903).
19.
WEGNER, supra note 8. § 310.
Although there were occasional voices for such change a generation later,
notably the 1966 President'sCommission report and even the 1970 Patent
Cooperation Treaty for procedural processing of applications, the U.S.
reform movement was largely dormant and in many circles highly
unpopular in the fifty year period since the end of World War II.
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common patent for the then-emerging forerunner of the European
Union (EU), the European Economic Community. 20
These
discussions produced an agreement on common substantive
patent law principles for the "European" system of today, found in

the 1963 Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of
Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions. 2 1

This "Strasbourg

Convention" was the blueprint for the substantive European
patent law that is embodied in the 1973 European Patent
Convention (EPC). The EPC is the substantive law of both the
European Patent Office (EPO) and each state within the EPO
system, because national law must be harmonized
with the EPO
22
EPO.
the
joining
for
condition
a
as
system
C. The Modem HarmonizationMovement
The modern patent harmonization movement may be traced
to 1985 and five years of Geneva meetings of a United Nations
Committee of Experts, whose goal was to draft a patent
harmonization treaty.2 3 The great success of the Geneva exercise
was the creation of a comprehensive and universal understanding
of the key points for a common, substantive patent law. Many
points were of obvious self-interest to the United States.
By 1989, a movement was started within interested domestic
circles to unilaterally adopt some of these points. A plenary
session of the Spring Stated Meeting of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association in Los Angeles, California, constituted a
trial balloon for issues that have now been enacted into law,
notably the twenty-year patent term, 24 as well as others under

20.

Id.

21.
Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on
Patents for Inventions, Nov. 27, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 47.
22.
Id. The United States sought countermeasures to Strasbourg. It
instigated the discussions leading to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19,
1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645. 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force for the United States
on June 1. 1978).
23.
For the origins of the treaty, see Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law
Slmpljflcatlon and the Geneva Patent Convention, 14 AIPLA O.J. L. ASS'N Q.J. 154
(1986). For a more comprehensive discussion of the treaty, see WEGNER, supra
note 8, which covers every section of the treaty and its origins and various
conferences up through 1992. The treaty, if enacted, would not modify the Paris
Convention, but would be a subservient treaty contemplated by Article 19, which
provides that "the [Paris union) countries.., reserve the right to make separately
between themselves special agreements for the protection of industrial property,
in so far as these agreements do not contravene the provisions of [the Paris)
Convention." Id.

24.

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4814

(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)) [hereinafter URAA1.
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active consideration (including automatic publication of patent
25
applications at eighteen months from first fling.
Optimism for quick resolution of patent harmonization was
scarce.2 6 Optimism for a comprehensive ,WIPO treaty totally
disappeared with the so-called "Manbeck Compromise"-a
unilateral declaration by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
repudiating a United States pledge to move to a frst-to-file
system, 27 which was a critical bargaining chip that had been
seemingly spent four years earlier by Mr. Manbeck's predecessor,
Donald Quigg. 2 8
Actions were taken during the Manbeck
administration to guarantee that it would not face short range
29
commitment to a harmonization treaty.

25.

See Harold C. Wegner. ProceduralPatent Reform Now, With or Without

Substantive Harmonization, VII SELECTED LEGAL PAPERS 67 (1989). For a more
comprehensive view, see Harold C. Wegner. PatentHarmonization, C554 ALI-ABA
171 (1990).
Four years later, the core elements most suitable for unilateral introduction
were the subject of the Patent Policy Conference, sponsored by the Dean
Dinwoodey Center for Intellectual Property Studies, September 27-28, 1993,
Airlee, Va., which was a patent policy symposium that brought together members
of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches with academics to discuss
patent policy issues relating to current reform proposals. As a result, a working
paper "discussion draft" was introduced substantially in toto in 1994 as The
Patent Slmpllflcation Act of 1994 by Senator DeConcini and was the subject of
Senate hearings. PTO OperationsExamined, J. PROPRIETARY RTs., May 1994, at 25
(1994) (reporting on the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyright and Trademarks of Mar. 9, 1994); Jeffrey L. Thompson, Note, The North

American Patent Office?

A Comparative Look at the NAFTA, the European

Communty, and the Community Patent Convention, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 501 (1994); Legislation: Senate Panel Considers Patent Reforms, Patent and
Trademark Office Operations, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 422
(1994).
26.
Hence, the movement for unilateral changes that started in Los
Angeles.
27.
For a detailed discussion of U.S. reluctance to move to a first-to-ffle
system, see infra Part III.
28.
Current Assistant Secretary of Commerce Bruce Lehman has not as
yet accepted first-to-ffle, but has indicated that it would be considered at such
time as a "true harmonization" treaty or agreement could be reached. True
harmonization is similar to patent worksharing, see infra Part II.D.
This view was publicly exposed in an announcement by Commerce Secretary
Ron Brown when he announced, in January of 1994, that the United States was
not prepared to move to first-to-file at that time. See infra Part II.D.
29.
Despite years of discussions and studies going back more than a full
generation to the 1966 President's Commission Report, including the vast amount
of work that went into preparations for the numerous experts' conferences in
Geneva, a cabinet level study was commissioned, guaranteeing that nothing could
happen until after conclusion of this lengthy effort. It was only in 1992 that an
approximately 200-page report of an Advisory Commission of the United States
Secretary of Commerce was released to the public. Patent Advisory Commission
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With inaction by the administration, Congress exercised a
leadership role. In 1992, the patent leadership in both bodies of
Congress jointly introduced harmonization legislation.
D. PatentWorksharlng Treaty
The term "Patent Worksharing Treaty" was coined to
comprehend one of the key benefits of a patent harmonization
treaty: a single patent grant procedure for all major countries of
the world. Each of the three major patent granting authorities,
Munich,
Tokyo, and Washington,
D.C.,
could divide
responsibilities with one of the other three offices while examining
a single patent application and then issue a grant covering all
30
territories.
III. RELUCTANCE TO MOVE TO FIRST-TO-FILE

The critical breakdown that destroyed United States
leadership, or even its continued participation in a meaningful
harmonization process, was over the manner of awarding a
priority right: "first inventor" in the United States versus first-tofile virtually everywhere else.

Urges FundamentalPatentLaw Reforms, 44 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
490 (1992).
30.
The term, Patent Worksharing Treaty, was introduced in testimony
before the Joint House-Senate hearings introducing the 1992 patent
harmonization domestic legislation. Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (dealing
with first-to-file legislation), reported in Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) (May
14, 1992). and Legislation:Patent System HarmonizationLegislation is Debated In
Joint Senate-House Hearing, 44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 3 (1992).
Controversy surrounded this legislation. See John R. Emshwiller. Patent-Law
ProposalsIrk Small Inventors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1992, at B 1; U.S. Inventors Say
Change in Patent Law Is Bad Idea, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 1. 1992, at 20; Paul A.
Ragusa. Eighteen Months to Publication: Should the United States Join Europe and
Japan By Promptly Publishing Patent Applications?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcON. 143, 158 (1992); R. Carl Moy, The History of the Patent Harmonization
Treaty: Economic Self-Interest as an Influence, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, n. 30
(1993). For a more comprehensive explanation of patent worksharing, see
WEGNER, supra note 8,§§ 500-60.

19961
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A. Two Similar Systems
1. The U.S. First Inventor System
Under the classic U.S. first inventor system, the patent
applicant is prima facie given a date of invention as of the filing of
the patent application. The applicant may establish an earlier

pre-filing date of invention by showing that the invention was
made3 l before the critical date of the competitor's date of
invention or a publication date of a third party's invention.

2. The International First-to-File System
European countries historically have always had a first-to-file
system under which the date of invention is conclusively the fling
date.3 2 The great benefit of first-to-file is certainty. All parties
know at an early date where they stand, before evidence is
or document production, as in the case of
gathered by depositions
33
interference.
patent
a
3. Trend Toward First-to-File
There is precious little difference in the operation of the two
systems when it is considered that only in the case of about fifty
or so patent applications per year, out of annual filings of roughly
two hundred thousand, is a person second-to-file able to establish

31.
Reference to when the invention is "made" simplifies matters for
purposes of this Article. If the inventor can prove that he or she has actually
constructed a physical embodiment of the invention and tested it to show that it
works, then the invention has been made in the sense that it has been "reduced
to practice." If the inventor has made a written description of the invention
without reduction to practice, the inventor may have made the invention in terms
However, unless the inventor has had
of a "conception" of the invention.
continuous "diligence" from one day before a competitor's critical date up until
the inventor's own reduction to practice or filing date, the conception is generally
for naught.
The statute states that
[iun determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention,
but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last
to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
32.
Of course, Paris Convention priority is possible for up to one year.
A "patent interference" is an administrative proceeding before the U.S.
33.
Patent and Trademark Office to determine priority of an invention where an
application may conflict with a pending application or unexpired patent. 35
U.S.C. § 135(a) (1988).
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priority in a final adjudication in a patent interference.
Otherwise, the same filing date ground rules are generally
applicable 3 4 under a first inventor system as under a first-to-fle
system.
Historically, both Japan and Canada were first inventor
countries. In 1919, Japan moved to first-to-ffle. 35 Canada, as
part of the global education obtained by participation in the U.N.
Committee of Experts, unilaterally enacted legislation in 1987 to
move to the harmonization model that was emerging at Geneva,
36
including institution of a first-to-file system.
B. Why the United States Resisted Change
United States citizens, particularly in regulated industries
such as pharmaceuticals, have long operated under a principle of
first-to-file. To do otherwise would have been ludicrous, because
failure to file early is to invite forfeiture of patent rights on a
nearly global basis. Thus, even if the U.S. inventor can establish
that he or she made an invention first, if the U.S. inventor is
second to file, then the inventor loses patent protection outside
37
the United States.

Yet, many in this same group have, although often rather
quietly, strongly opposed patent harmonization because of the
first-to-file system in foreign countries. In fact, the answer is
more subtle: it is the discriminatory provisions on establishing a
date of invention against foreign companies that is critical in the
opposition to first-to-file. Prior to the WTO, the first inventor
system could not generally be used3 8 by foreign corporations. The
effective bar to foreign usage is found in the statute: "In [patent

34.
This is not quite the case when one considers that a third party
publication of subject matter dfferent from a claimed invention that Is prior art
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (e), may be overcome by proving an earlier date of
invention than the publication. The method of establishing proof of priority Is
through an ex parte affidavit or declaration. Affidavits Overcoming Rejections, 37
C.F.R. § 1.131 (1995).
35.
According to discussions with Professor Yoichiro Yamaguchi of George
Washington University, the Japanese system, with its lack of discovery or other
appropriate means for determining priority of invention, opted for the simpler
first-to-file system.
36.
The remaining first inventor country, the Philippines, has considered
legislation in recent years to also move to first-to-file.
37.
The second-to-file also generally loses in the United States as well,
even if the inventor can prove an earlier date of invention.
38.
See Harold C. Wegner, The One in Ten Thousand Chancefor Foreign
Usage of the American First Inventor System, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
175 (1994). See also Harold C. Wegner, Domestic Diligence Trap for Foreign
Inventors, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 849 (1993); cf. Charles L. Gholz,
Letter to the Editor, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 174 (1994).
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an applicant for a patent...

545

may

to knowledge or use
not establish a date of invention by reference
39
[of the invention]... in a foreign country."
Since applicants will generally file their patent application a
few months (or more) after the invention has been made, if the
U.S. inventor is second-to-file against a foreigner by only a few
months, the inventor has a good shot at winning a patent
interference suit. While the foreigner will also have made the
invention before the filing date, the uneven playing field created
by the statutory preclusion against foreign activity makes it more
likely than not that the U.S. inventor can win the patent
interference, and, hence, establish exclusive patent rights in the
United States.
While it is unfortunate that the U.S. inventor will not have
foreign rights as part of this overall plan, in fact, U.S. inventors
generally will gain foreign rights. This is because the United
States is the single most important national market in the world,
and the foreigner who will win abroad under first-to-file does not
want to be shut out of this key market. Rather than fight a costly
and lengthy patent interference suit to determine U.S. rights that
he or she may lose, the foreigner is more likely than not to enter
into a global settlement that will result in a shared market
position for both sides.
As of January 1, 1996, 35 U.S.C. § 104 now permits
Japanese and other foreigners to establish "home country" dates
of invention for patent interferences. This creates an uneven
playing field for U.S. inventors, who generally have greater
difficulty understanding Japanese and other foreign language
documents of competitors (as opposed to the ready understanding
of English by foreigners). The fact that former Section 104 was
important to U.S. industry (and not the first-to-file versus first
inventor controversy) is manifested by the candid admission of a
retired vice-president of a U.S. pharmaceutical leader, who was
one of the strongest critics of first-to-file, and a long-time
First, the conflict
supporter of the first inventor system.40
"[Bilocking positions
between the systems is acknowledged:
[occur] on a worldwide basis because of the first to invent' patent

39.

35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).

This section was superseded by 35 U.S.C. §

104(a) (1993), which permits proof of inventive activity in Mexico or Canada.
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993). Effective January 1, 1994, dates of invention could be

proved based upon acts of invention in Mexico or Canada as from a date as early
as December 8, 1993.
David J. Mugford, Licensing of Biotechnology: Introduction to the New
40.
Decade 287 PLI/Pat 431 (1990).
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system in the [United States] as opposed to the 'first to file'
system in the EPO and JPO." On the one hand, it was recognized
that the slow-to-file U.S. inventor loses rights at home, but
thanks to the uneven advantage of 35 USC § 104 coupled with the
immense size and value of the U.S. market, the potential exists to
recoup foreign patent rights as part of a global settlement. Thus,
the "European and Japanese researchers in the biotechnology
field may have been the first to invent in their own country but
were clearly the first to file in their country of origin claiming
priority of invention in all Paris Convention countries including
the [United States]."4 ' Adding the statutory discrimination to the
equation, it is concluded that
if a U.S. inventor could show conception and reduction to practice
in the [United States] prior to the foreign Inventor's Paris
Convention priority date, Le.. the fling date in the country of origin,
the U.S. applicant could obtain the U.S. patent for the protein or
process of making same whereas the foreign inventor could4 2obtain
patents for the same subject matter in the rest of the world.

The manifest answer is a global settlement driven by this
discrimination: "Since all of the research-based pharmaceutical
companies and most of the now-emerged biotechnology
companies are in global markets, and the [United States]
represents approximately one-third of such market, a reasonable
situation would be to
solution to this global market blocking
43
other."
each
cross-licensing
by
unblock

IV. URUGUAY NEGOTIATIONS: NORTHERN REFOCUS

When the TRIPS discussions were in their infancy, the
emerging position of the "North" was to create strong minimum
standards in developing countries so that patent protection could
flourish to the benefit of the pharmaceutical industry, which was
often precluded from any meaningful patent protection. 4 4 With
the Manbeck Compromise signalling the death of any early
chance favoring patent harmonization, an indirect approach was
taken by forces for patent harmonization. These forces sought
the introduction of even-playing-field standards for establishing a
date of invention. To kick out the prop of statutory discrimination

41.

Id. (emphasis added).

42.

Id.

Id.
43.
For an excellent contemporaneous discussion of the early period of
44.
negotiation of TRIPS, see Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In International
Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
747 (1989).
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from the first inventor system would in fact make a push for first-

to-file unnecessary from the European and Japanese viewpoint.

To the extent that foreign applicants could prove a date of
invention based upon their home country inventive activity, they
would have a decided advantage over their United States

competitors.
In theory, elimination of the discrimination found in U.S. law
would level the playing field. In practice, however, this is not
true. By making everyone "equal" in terms of being able to prove
a date of invention based upon home country activity, Japanese
and other foreign inventors have a tremendous advantage.
First, the Japanese have long been able to survive the
intricacies of patent interference proceedings and to understand
and attack the positions of their opponents. English is the first
language of their attorneys, and most Japanese executives and
scientists who assist in the patent interference procedures have
at least ten years of formal classroom English. They are readily
able to understand the masses of complex documentation that
inventors and their corroborators from the opposing U.S.
organization may produce.
On the other hand, the U.S. attorney representing the U.S.
opponent generally has zero knowledge of written or spoken
Japanese. The U.S. corporate team supporting the lawyer is
equally untrained in the Japanese language. This discrepancy is
entirely uneven and presents the Japanese with a great advantage
over the United States in U.S. patent proceedings.

V. DEFEATING SECTION 104 THROUGH TRIPS

A. Perfecting a WTO Ban on Section 104
As an outgrowth of the Manbeck Compromise and the

appearance that any direct move to first-to-file was dead, leaders
refocused their attention on the Uruguay negotiations in an effort
to kill Section 104 4 5 -the statutory bar to proving dates of
Clearly, Section 104
invention based upon foreign activity.
"discriminates on the basis of the country of invention for
purposes of establishing the date of invention and the first
With surprisingly little opposition, 4 7 national
inventor." 4 6
treatment provisions were introduced into TRIPS.

45.
46.

See supra Part IV.
See Reichman, supra note 2, at 352 n. 41.
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First, it is obvious that Section 104 violates even the existing

"national treatment" provision of the Paris Convention. 48 This
violation was made an automatic violation of TRIPS by virtue of
49
the TRIPS Agreement itself.

Second, the harmonization movement went further and
provided a parallel national treatment provision in the Agreement
itself. TRIPS provides that "patents shall be available ... without
discrimination as to the place of invention."5 0
B. An Attenuated Section 104
The United States, instead of outright proscribing a
continuation of Section 104, implemented TRIPS by attenuating
Section 104 in a minimalistic manner, arguably in compliance
with the national treatment standards of both the Paris
Convention (as incorporated into TRIPS) and TRIPS itself.
To attempt to maintain the old system while complying with
the explicit TRIPS requirements for national treatment and the
parallel Paris Convention requirements under Article 2, three
clear violations have emerged, two statutory and one in a
proposed regulation.
1. Failure to Amend Section 102(g)
The United States has failed to amend 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
This means that the statutory basis for finding a patent-defeating
effect against the loser of an interference is unchanged and
limited to the prior invention of another in the United States.
In the statute, the only way that the losing party to a patent
interference is denied a claim is through the sequence of (a) an
interference where priority of invention is established for the
winning party; and (b) as a result of the interference, the losing
party is subjected to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) on the

basis that before the date of the losing party's invention, the
invention was made "in this country" by the winning party. 6 1 The
wording "in this country" has been interpreted as denying a

47.
There is nothing to indicate that the major proponents of a continued
first inventor system had any knowledge of the implications of the movement.
48.
Paris Convention, supranote 15, art. 2.
49.
Article 2(1) of TRIPS states that "[iln respect of Part II . . . of this
Agreement [including patents in Sec. 5), Members shall comply with Articles 1
[through] 12, and [Article] 19, of the Paris Convention ([Stockholm Revision]
1967)." TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
50.
Id. art. 27(1). See also Reichman, supranote 2.
51.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
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patent defeating effect
as of a foreign invention date, such as a
52

foreign priority date.
Thus, even if one wins an interference suit based upon proof
of a date of invention in Germany, Canada, Japan, or another
country outside the United States, there is no statutory basis to
use this earlier date of invention to deny the losing party a patent
in the United States. Therefore, while the foreign inventor may
"win" the interference in the sense that the foreign inventor gains
a patent outside the United States, there is little benefit to offset
the expense of a patent interference suit outside the United States
that would result in the losing party only obtaining rights outside
of the United States. In other words, if there is no statutory basis
for the losing party to be denied a patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g), then there is no patent-defeating right for the winning
party to deny the losing party its claims.
Therefore, while proof of a date of invention is not precluded
based upon foreign activity in WTO member states under a
revised 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1), the key statutory provision for
providing the substantive patent-defeating effect is 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g). Thus, as a result of a patent interference where a
foreign party would establish priority under 35 U.S.C. § 104 by
proving acts in the foreign party's home country, these acts would
have no value under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) to deny a patent to a
second inventor who was first to establish the invention in the
United States. Key leaders in the United States have made it
clear that the absence of a statutory basis for denying a losing
party claims at the end of an interference represents a clear
53
problem.
The direction given by the judiciary that 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) is
not to be given an extraterritorial effect is manifest in the Hilmer 11
case. 54 A U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) official, during
the period of preparation of the GATT implementing legislation,

acknowledged that there was "[slome concern... that the failure
to amend § 102(g) could lead to some strange and unjust
55
results."

52.
In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Hilmer II) (interpretation
of patent-defeating effect of prior foreign invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)). For
earlier proceedings on the same case, see In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A.
1966) (Hilmer I).
53.

ROBERT A. ARMITAGE, THE FOREIGN-BASED INVENTOR7S UNPRECEDENTED

OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE URAA 6-92 (21st Annual Intellectual Property Law
Workshop-ICLE, 1995).
54.
HilmerlI, 424 F.2d 1108.
55.
Charles E. Van Horn, Effects of GATT and NAFTA on PTO Practice,77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 231, 234 (1995).
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More than "strange" or "unjust," the absence of a statutory
patent-defeating effect against the interference losing party means
that the United States is not in full compliance with its promises
under TRIPS to provide a level playing field for international
applicants under its first inventor system. Some argue that the
Deckler case5 6 circumvents the problem. 5 7
This position,
however, is difficult to defend. In contrast to the view by Van
Horn that Deckler solves the problem, Irving and Lewis say that
"[o]ne can urge... that Deckler is limited to a situation where the
interference loser admits that the claims are not separately
patentable from the [interference] lost count."5 8
Robert Armitage sides with the skepticism expressed by
Irving and Lewis. He states that the Deckler-based reasoning "is,
at best, bizarre." 5 9 This view is paralleled by writings of Kevin L.
Leffel and Charles L. Gholz, which are critical of Deckler.60 The
limitation of Section 102(g) to domestic acts is clearly stated in
61
the Hilmer I1 case.
While acknowledging the problem,6 2 the PTO justifies its
failure to propose an amendment to Section 102(g) as part of the
TRIPS domestic implementing legislation with the argument that
"[a]n amendment to Section 102(g) is not necessary to preclude

56.
In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
57.
See Van Horn, supranote 55, at 234-35.
58.
Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and
Infringement after GATTITRIPS. 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309. 322 (1994). Irving and Lewis
add that "[m]ore logically, [Deckler] applies whenever the claims [of the
interference loser] are in fact patentably indistinct [from the count of the
interference]... ." Id.
59.
See ARMITAGE, supra note 53.
60.
Kevin L. Leffel, HilmerDoctrine and Patent System Harmonization: What
Does a Foreign Inventor Have at Stake?. 26 AKRON L. REv. 355, 388 n. 401 (1992)
("Charles L. Gholz concludes that In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992)..
. prevent[s] a party from patenting claims that are patentably indistinct from an
interference count of the basis of interference estoppel and that McKellin is a
'curious historical anomaly.' ") (citing Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent
Opinions in the FederalCircuitin PatentInterferences, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEILARK OFF.
Soc'Y 448, 475-76 (1993)).
61.
In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1113 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
62.
See Van Horn, supra note 55, at 234.
For example, consider a party that loses an interference to another who
proves a date of invention in a NAFTA [or WTOI country. The losing party,
it is argued, could obtain a U.S. patent for practically the same claims lost
in interference because there is no prior art basis for rejecting the claims
of the losing party that are patentably indistinct from the interference
count. The prior invention by another in a NAFTA [or WTO] country would
not be prior art under § 102(g) because the invention was not made in this
country.
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two patents from issuing to different parties on patentably
indistinct inventions. The doctrine of interference estoppel has
circumstances to avoid this clearly
been applied in similar
63
undesirable result."
Responding to the PTO's Deckler-based view, the conclusion
must be reached that "[tihe brave words [that Deckler-based
estoppel will work] notwithstanding, a foreign first inventor may
not be the first inventor in the United States, and without this
status, no statutory reason exists for denominating such [the
losing] inventor the 'losing party.' ""
The argument that Deckler will solve the failure to amend
Section 102(g) is reiterated:
[Wlithout an adverse judgement properly statutorily grounded [in
an amended § 102(g)], what is there to estop? Interferenceestoppel
is an estoppel to deny that an adverse party to the interference
established a prior invention in this country... with respect to

certain claims. The claims subject to the estoppel are any claims
that a party could have placed in issue in the interference, but
neglected to contest (e.g., by the filing of an appropriate
"preliminary motion"). But if no prior invention in this country is
put into evidence, what estoppel can exist? No basis for judgment
must emphatically mean no basis for estoppel.6 5

If there is to be a judicial resolution as to whether Hilmer 1H

will be disregarded or overruled (something that is not in any
event to be expected), that resolution cannot be realistically
expected before the next century 6

63.

Id. (citing In re Decider, 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).

64.

ARMITAGE, supranote 53, at 6. 93.

65.
Id. Deckler is thoroughly analyzed by Armitage, id. at 6. 93-95, who
points out the unique facts of the case that do not provide basis for any general
rule. He concludes with a question: "Is the narrow holding of Deckler on the very
unusual facts of Deckler enough to support a broad rule that the mere conduct of
an interference is sufficient to assure that the 'judgment' against the loser will
establish a 'prior invention' judgement?" Id. at 6,95.
66.
There will be no interferences won based upon foreign activity until at
least nearly that time, as acts of invention in a foreign country before 1996 are
not counted under the transition provisions. Even if there were administrative
resolution of an interference at the PTO by,say, "2000," there would then need to
be an ex parte denial of the losing parties claims, which would then need to be
followed by an appeal to the Federal Circuit-or, even worse, by litigation in the
courts on a patent based upon such a losing party's application, followed by
appeal to the Federal Circuit. Even excluding the two- to three-year backlog of
some of the major precedential patent appeals awaiting decision at the Federal
Circuit, the pathway to ultimate judicial resolution Is hardly around the comer.
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2. Special Privileges Under Section 104(a)(2)
Under Section 104(a)(2), United States citizens (or citizens of
NAFTA or WTO member states) are given preferential treatment In
establishing priority of invention in foreign countries. This Is a
clear violation of the "national treatment" provisions of Article 2 of
67
the Paris Convention.
Special privileges for proof of a date of invention for citizens
of the United States and NAFTA and WTO member states under
35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) based upon their own activities in any
country discriminate against foreign applicants by nationality, as
opposed to where an invention is made. In this sense, Section
104(a)(2) is a clear violation of Article 2 of the Paris Convention.
3. Discriminatory Regulations
While the United States, as a matter of statute, honors
foreign evidence of a date of invention for activity in WTO member
states, it does so grudgingly and in a potentially discriminatory
fashion. Clearly, most, if not all, countries of the world have

systems of discovery that are either nonexistent or at least not as
sweeping as the unique U.S. system.
states:

Yet, the new U.S. law

To the extent that any information in... a WTO member country
concerning knowledge, use, or other activity relevant to proving or
disproving a date of invention has not been made available for use
in a proceeding in the Patent and Trademark Office .... to the
same extent as such information could be made available in the
United States, the Commissioner, court, or . . . other authority
shall draw appropriate inferences, or take other action permitted
by statute, rule, or regulation, in favor of the party that requested
68
the information in the proceeding.

It is argued that a foreign party can voluntarily turn over
information in its control and thereby live within the wording of
the statute.
However, the regulations that have been
implemented by the Commissioner go much further and
mandatorily direct action against the foreign party even in the
case where the matter sought by the adverse party is entirely
outside the control of the foreign party. This is seen from the
regulations that provide for issuance of sanctions, 6 9 including
such extreme measures as "[hiolding certain facts to have been

67.
68.

Paris Convention, supra note 15, art. 2.
URAA, supra note 24.

69.

37 C.F.R. § 1.616(a) (1995).
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interference" 70 or even "[granting judgment in
established in the
71
the interference."
While the statute permits sanctions where a party does not
provide foreign evidence, the regulations go far beyond the statute
and require sanctions even where the foreign party is not at fault.
Thus, it is provided in the regulations that:
To the extent that an administrative patent judge or the Board has
authorized a party to compel the taking of testimony or the
production of documents or things from an Individual or entity
located in...
a WTO member country concerning knowledge, use,
or other activity relevant to proving or disproving a date of
invention § 1.671(h)), but the testimony, documents or things have
not been produced for use in the interference to the same extent as
such information could be made available in the United States, the
administrative patent judge or the Board shall draw such adverse
inferences as may be appropriate under the circumstances, or take
such other action permitted by statute, rule, or regulation, in favor
of the party that requested the information 7 2in the interference,
including imposition of appropriate sanctions.
73
The regulatory implementation is clearly discriminatory.
In the rule-making process, it was "questioned whether the
failure of an individual or entity located in . .. a WTO member
country to provide the information requested by a party can result

in the imposition of sanctions against an opponent from that
country even though the opponent is not at fault."7 4 One can
imagine, for example, that evidence would be sought from a
retired scientist or someone who has resigned and now works for

a competitor.

A Japanese interference litigant clearly does not

have any legal mechanism to compel cooperation from a resigned
employee, particularly not to the same extent as under U.S.
discovery regulations. Yet, the PTO has said that "It]he answer is

yes."75

Ignoring the implications of prejudice against foreign

interference litigants, the official explanation was simply that
"[o]ne purpose of [the amended text of] 35 U.S.C. 104 is to ensure
that evidence for interferences is available in foreign countries in
essentially the same manner that it is available in the United
States. If the evidence is not available, then the appropriate
78
inference provisions of 35 U.S.C. 104 shall be applied by PTO."

70.
71.
72.

Id. § 1.616(a)(1).
Id. § 1.616(a)(6).
Id. § 1.616(c) (emphasis added).

73.
One may question whether a regulation can be valid where it is not
required by statute and goes so far as to put the United States into violation of
the very treaty that the statute was designed to implement.
74.
60 Fed. Reg. 14488, 14493 (1995) (emphasis added).
75.
Id. at 14493-94.
76.
Id. at 14494 (emphasis added).
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C. FalsePromise of the ProvisionalSystem
Some commentators argue that the United States offers all
inventors, including foreign inventors, a simplified way to prove a
date of invention through the new provisional application
system. 7 7
There has even been an interpretation of the
provisional system that allows one to prove a reduction to practice
of an invention even if there is no formal priority basis for a later
claim alleging such reduction to practice.
It has been stated that "[e]ven though a provisional
application does not contain sufficient information to support a
claim in a subsequent [regular] application, it may contain
sufficient information to establish a constructive reduction to
practice of at least one embodiment of [the] invention."78 Van
Horn continues that "[tihis information [of a single embodiment in
the provisional] could be sufficient . . . to establish a date of
invention in an interference proceeding or to show a date of
invention prior to the effective date of a [prior art] reference under
79
37 C.F.R. § 1.131."
The difficulty with this argument is that it would require that
new legal ground be broken. Currently, this viewpoint has basis
only if the later application is copending and if there is a claim in
the later case that finds a "written description" basis in the earlier
application. 80 Otherwise, it would be necessary to overrule In re
Costello.8 1
In Costello, the applicant sought to overcome the date of a
reference by establishing the existence of an earlier (but
abandoned) U.S. filing to the same invention. 82 Since the earlier
U.S. application was abandoned before the fling of the
application on appeal, the condition precedent for priority as a

continuation was not met. 8 3

77.
This part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act Is found in 35 U.S.C.
§ 111(b) (1988).
78.
Charles E. Van Horn, Practicalities and Potential Pitfalls When Using
ProvisionalPatentApplications, 22 AIPLA Q. J. 259, 276 (1974).
79.
Id. at 276-77. The omitted portion of the sentence states that priority

would be granted either based upon the provisional application information
"alone or in combination with existing prior art."
80.

35 U.S.C. § 112,

1 (1988).

81.
In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
82.
The invention was made In Canada and was not introduced into the
United States at a date earlier enough to overcome the prior art reference.
83.
If the present case had been filed before the abandonment of the first
case, then the present case could have constituted a continuation under 35
U.S.C. § 120 (1994). Then, there would not have been the problem raised In the
appeal.
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As the court pointed out in Costello, "Because the
requirements of [35 U.S.C. §1 120 had not been satisfied, the
board refused to recognize the filing of the original application as
a constructive reduction to practice of the invention."8 4 While the
filhng could be considered to constitute a "conception" of the
invention, this was meaningless because continuous diligence is a
priority of invention versus an
condition precedent to establishing
85
intervening prior art reference.
The mere filing of the application does not constitute a
constructive reduction to practice, which, if found, would have
established priority because no diligence is required to establish

priority based upon a reduction to practice. Yet, the case law
dating back to the nineteenth century provides basis for denial of
a finding of a constructive reduction to practice. As pointed out
in Costello:
Appellants' principal contention is that the filing of the later
constructive
abandoned original application constitutes a
reduction to practice of the invention.... It has long been settled,
and we continue to approve the rule, that an abandoned
application, with which no subsequent application was copending,
cannot be considered a constructive reduction to practice.8 6 It is
inoperative for any purpose, save as evidence of conception.

84.
Costello, 717 F.2d at 1348.
85.
To overcome the prior art, there must be proof of "conception of the
invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence
from said date to a subsequent reduction to practice or to the filing of the
Since the patent applicant was
application." 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b) (1995).
Canadian and carrying out his work (including any diligence) in Canada, 35
U.S.C. § 104 precluded any reliance upon such diligence for purposes of 37
C.F.R. § 1.131 (1995) (emphasis added).
86.
Costello. 717 F.2d at 1350 (citing Carty v. Kellogg, 7 App.D.C. 542,
1896 C.D. 188 (1896)). The court in Costello explains that
Carty involved a fact situation almost identical to the present case. Carty
ifiled an original application April 20, 1885, which was abandoned October
21, 1887. Kellogg filed an application July 30, 1887. Subsequently, on
November 17, 1887, Carty filed a second application. An interference was
generated and Carty tried to rely on the abandoned application as a
constructive reduction to practice in order to establish priority. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
'Failing in proof of actual reduction. Carty is forced to rely upon
constructive reduction to practice, and, in order to antedate Kellogg,
he claims it by virtue of his abandoned application of 1885. It seems
to be a reasonable and well-established principle, conformed to in
the practice of the Patent Office, that an abandoned application
cannot be so considered.... Having lapsed, it becomes inoperative
for any purpose, save as evidence of the date of conception, and to
that extent it has already been considered and its weight admitted.'
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There is a seeming inconsistency between the general rule
that filing a patent application constitutes a constructive
reduction to practice of an invention disclosed in that application,
while in Costello that very act was denied such status. This is
explained by the court in Costello: "While the filing of the original
application theoretically constituted a constructive reduction to
practice at the time [of filing and during its pendency], the
subsequent abandonment of that application also resulted in an
abandonment of the8 7benefit of that filing as a constructive
reduction to practice."
D. Slow Death to the FirstInventor System
It has been only since January 1, 1996, that foreign activity
outside North America 8 8 may be used to establish priority of
invention. It will be at least a couple of years before the first
declaration of a patent interference is declared where this wil be
important. Therefore, no companies in the United States are
presently inconvenienced or prejudiced by the difficulties they will
face.
At the same time, the discrimination that continues to exist
under Section 104 provides a source of friction, if not a basis for a
dispute settlement request.8 9 It may be anticipated that at such
time as there is a bi- or multi-national agreement to be reached
on patent worksharing or "true harmonization," the attenuated
first inventor system may well become a bargaining chip to reach
an overall agreement.

VI. HILMER I: TARGET FROM THIRTY YEARS AGO

A. The Hilmer I Problem
In international circles, the second target after first-to-file
has been the elimination of the notorious Hilmer I decision, which
unfairly denies foreign patentee's their patent-defeating right
guaranteed by the Paris Convention. 90 As of the 1934 London

Id. (citations omitted).

87.

Id.

88.
North American inventive activity may be established from acts from
December 8, 1993. See supra note 39.
89.
Since the overall system is an advantage to foreign applicants, no
pressing need to push a dispute settlement is seen.
90.
See supra note 52. See also Harold C. Wegner & Jochen Pagenberg.
Paris Convention Priority: A Unique American Viewpoint Denying 'The Same Effect'
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Revision of the Paris Convention, which originally provided a
reserve des droits des tiers or "reservation of third party rights"
under Article 4(B), an explicit right to deny a third party patent
was guaranteed as of the priority date.9 1 Thus, if a competitor
files a patent application with a claim including an applicant's
invention and the applicant is entitled to priority anterior to that
of the competitor, then the competitor's claim is barred to the
extent that the claim of the applicant's patent reads on that
competitor's embodiment.
As part of domestic reform, it is expected that 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) will be amended to eliminate its effect for purposes of an
obviousness determination under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 92 When the
United States does amend 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) to remove it from
the category of "secret" prior art for obviousness under § 103(a),
patent also should be changed
the patent-defeating date of a U.S.
93
to include a foreign priority date.
For more than twenty years, it has been well-settled in
international circles that the United States has failed to fully
implement the 1934 London Revision to the Paris Convention
insofar as the patent-defeating right given to the patentee to
defeat the claim of any party filing in the Paris Convention
interval to the same invention as later patented by the patentee.
This right is explicit in Article 4(B) of the Paris Convention as part
of the limitation of the reserve des droits des tiers in the 1934
London Revision.
The ruling in Hilmer 194 has no value in the determination of
whether the U.S. law is or is not in violation of the Paris
Convention, apart from whatever persuasive reasoning may be
found in that opinion. In essence, the opinion says that there is
no patent-defeating priority right in the Paris Convention and
that, in any event, the U.S. law is independent of the treaty
provisions. The latter point may be entirely neglected because the
precise issue is whether the U.S. law is in compliance with the
patent-defeating priority right of the Paris Convention. There is
no solid reasoning in the opinion to deal with this issue, as the

to the ForeignFiling, 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 361 (1974); see also
Donald G. Daus, ParisConvention Priority,77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 138,

144 n. 35. (1995).
91.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883. 25 Stat. 1372, as revised June 2. 1934, 53 Stat. 1748. See also supra note
14.
Effective November 1, 1995, the test of obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
92.

§ 103 (as set forth in the first paragraph thereof) is now 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Pub.
L. 104-41, 109 Stat. 351 (1995).
35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (1988).
93.
94.
In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (1966).
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primary focus is on the treaty as originally implemented in 1903
and on the patent-obtaining rights of Article 4 of the Paris
Convention. Neither the patent-obtaining rights, Article 4, nor
the 1903 version of the Paris Convention are at issue in the
international complaints about the patent-defeating right of the
entirely different provisions of Article 4B, which was only revised
to its present form as part of the 1934 London Revision that
created a limitation on the drolts des tiers. The total absence of
any meaningful consideration of the 1934 London Revision and
the manner of modification of the reserve des drolts des tiers
speaks for itself as to the meaningless guidance given by the
Hilmer opinion-a low point in judicial understanding of
international patent practice and treaties. 95
B. TRIPS: ForcingConsiderationof the Paris Convention
Arrogant defiance of Article 4(B) of the Paris Convention has
been possible because there is no enforcement mechanism under
that treaty. Now, with this provision of the Paris Convention
being incorporated into the treaty obligations under TRIPS, 96 it is
time that the United States honors its Paris Convention
obligations to introduce a patent-defeating right as required by
this treaty.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the major patent thrust of TRIPS has been and
continues to be the creation of a strong international patent
system with country-by-country protection of pharmaceuticals
and other high-technology fruits of U.S. innovation, the United
States must honor its treaty commitments with fairness and
diligence. As a byproduct of such international cooperation, the
world can move more quickly in the direction of patent
worksharing and provide a reasonable mechanism for obtaining
and enforcing a global patent portfolio.

95.
Even worse than the accidental prejudice of Hilmer, which can be
blamed either on sloppy domestic implementation of the 1934 London Revision or
a Judicial mistake from nearly thirty years ago, the deliberatecreation of a Hilmerlike discrimination in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) cannot be excused. The
current law denies a foreign applicant a patent-defeating date as of the foreign

applicant's PCT filing date; this is an express violation of the PCT, which the
United States government has formally acknowledged through its reservation
under PCT Rule 64(4).
96.
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 2.

